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Note
Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining
the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Nicholas Tymoczko*
Nearly every complaint filed in federal court must meet the
simple pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).1 It is a shame, then,
that no one seems to know what exactly these requirements en-
tail. As one judge observed, "We district court judges suddenly
and unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over something we
thought we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a
motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim."2 This was
not always so. For fifty years, the rule on pleading was clear:
"[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."3
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly changed all that.4 The
Court "retired" Conley's famous statement and held that a con-
spiracy claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act based on pa-
rallel conduct must contain "enough facts to state a claim to re-
lief that is plausible on its face."5 In so doing, it introduced
what came to be called the "plausibility standard"-a new
pleading standard against which the sufficiency of complaints
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2003,
University of Chicago. Special thanks to E. Thomas Sullivan for his help in
developing this topic and his guidance along the way. Thanks also to Elizabeth
Borer, Charles E. Dickinson, and Dan Ganin for comments on earlier drafts,
and to the Volume 94 Executive Board for their patience. Copyright C 2009 by
Nicholas Tymoczko.
1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (specifying the standards for a complaint).
2. Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves
in the Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 851, 853 (2008).
3. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
4. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
5. Id. at 1974.
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is assessed.6 Unfortunately, the precise meaning of this stan-
dard was anything but clear,7 and a variety of often conflicting
and incomplete interpretations emerged.8
Late this past spring, the Court brought some clarity to the
issue. Ashcroft v. Iqbal made clear what had largely been as-
sumed all along, namely that the plausibility standard is a
transsubstantive pleading standard applicable to all claims
brought in federal court.9 Beyond that, however, Iqbal did little
to clarify the meaning of "plausibility."0 Instead, it situated
the plausibility standard in a two-prong analytical framework
under which a court must first identify a complaint's noncon-
clusory allegations and then determine whether those allega-
tions state a plausible claim for relief." Accordingly, most of
the myriad definitions of plausibility that developed post-
Twombly continue to be applied.
Not only does this create uncertainty for litigants and
courts,12 it also has the potential to significantly increase the
pleading burden plaintiffs face, for in many ways Twombly and
especially Iqbal can be read as extreme opinions.13 One court,
for example, has gone so far as to suggest that "even the official
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Forms . . . have been cast into
doubt by Iqbal."14 Rather than embrace the most extreme as-
pects and language of these opinions, this Note seeks to develop
6. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV.
431, 441-47 (2008).
7. E.g., Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire:
What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over
Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1257 (2008) ("Virtually everyone ... regards
plausibility as an ambiguous standard.").
8. E.g., Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525
F.3d 8, 15 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Many courts have disagreed about the import
of Twombly.").
9. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
10. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity
in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript
at 67), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1428992 ("Precisely what the
Twombly pleading standard requires stirred debate and probably remains un-
certain after Iqbal.").
11. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
12. E.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1, 10, 27-28 (2009).
13. E.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1442786 ("[Tihe current discourse threatens to make Iqbal's (and Twombly's)
effect on pleading standards a self-fulfilling prophecy.").
14. Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. Civ. 09-
245, 2009 WL 2424608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009).
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a definition of "plausibility" that preserves the basic tenets of
simplified pleading and brings clarity to the keystone of the
federal procedural system. Part I first provides an overview of
the system of notice pleading created by the Federal Rules and
developed by the Supreme Court; it then describes in greater
detail Twombly and Iqbal. Part II discusses and critiques at-
tempts by courts and commentators to define the plausibility
standard. Part III argues that the plausibility standard is best
understood as a minimal standard, representing at most a
small break from past pleading practice, which requires only
that a complaint support a reasonable inference that the plain-
tiff has a viable claim, which a court is then required to draw.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS
Prior to 2007, the Supreme Court's pleading jurisprudence
more or less consistently affirmed the liberal pleading stan-
dards envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules. Bell At-
lantic Corp. v. Twombly marked a potentially startling break
from this tradition. Two years later, the Supreme Court, in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, expanded on Twombly, confirming that its
plausibility standard applies to all complaints.
A. FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS PRE-TWOMBLY: THE
PROCEDURAL SYSTEM CREATED BY THE FEDERAL RULES
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938, notice pleading, as it came to be called, replaced the
stringencies and technicalities of common law and code plead-
ing.15 No longer would plaintiffs be required to plead ultimate
facts constituting a cause of action, avoiding evidence on the
one hand and conclusions of law on the other.16 Instead, plead-
ing under the Rules was premised on "a system of simple, di-
15. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1), (e) (requiring only "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"; specifi-
cally rejecting the requirement of technical forms; and mandating that plead-
ings "be construed so as to do justice"); Charles E. Clark, The Proposed Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 447, 450 (1937) (contrasting the "ex-
treme flexibility and adaptability" of pleading practice under the Rules with
the technical requirements of code pleading); Christopher M. Fairman, Heigh-
tened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 554-55 (2002); Richard L. Marcus, The
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 433, 437-40 (1986).
16. E.g., 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1216, 1218 (3d ed. 2004); Clark, supra note 15,
at 450; see also Fairman, supra note 15, at 556 (noting that under the Federal
Rules pleadings serve a single function, providing notice).
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rect allegation" by which the plaintiff initiated litigation and
informed the defendant and the court of the general nature and
basis of the claim.17 Nothing more was required of the plead-
ings, for liberal discovery coupled with summary judgment pro-
vided superior means for performing the other traditional pre-
trial tasks of narrowing the issues, uncovering the facts, and
resolving early disputes about proof.18 The underlying goal of
this procedural system was to efficiently set the stage for trial,
where the case would be resolved on the merits. 19
Conley v. Gibson endorsed the liberal ethos embodied by
the Federal Rules and, in so doing, gave content to Rule 8.20 Re-
jecting the need for specific facts in support of general allega-
tions and compliance with technical niceties, the Court held
that Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "'a short and plain statement of
the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."21
Apart from failing to satisfy these minimal notice require-
ments, the Court stated that a complaint should be dismissed
only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief."22 Conley thus announced two standards that pleadings
must meet: one formal (adequate notice), the other substantive
or legal (any possible factual support warranting legal relief).
Time and again the Supreme Court affirmed Conley's in-
terpretation of federal pleading standards and their role in the
broader, liberal procedural system. 23 Accordingly, when a court
17. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 272-73,
278 (1942); see also Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21
F.R.D. 45, 47, 49, 53-54 (1957) (discussing the rules that address pleading).
18. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.
L.Q. 297, 314-19 (1938) [hereinafter Clark, Handmaid]; Charles E. Clark, The
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase-Underlying Philosophy
Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J.
976, 977 (1937).
19. See generally Clark, Handmaid, supra note 18, at 318-20 (discussing
how the Rules subordinate procedure to substance so that cases are resolved
on the merits).
20. 355 U.S. 41, 45-48 (1957).
21. Id. at 47-48 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
22. Id. at 45-46.
23. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-14 (2002) (reject-
ing the requirement that a Title VII plaintiff "plead a prima facie case of dis-
crimination" and explaining that "[t]he liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is
the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus
litigation on the merits of a claim"); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (concluding that
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rules on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
it must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, view
them in a light most favorable to the pleader, and draw all rea-
sonable inferences from the allegations in favor of the plead-
er.2 4 This ensures that only the most defective complaints are
dismissed before discovery.
Notice pleading contrasts with heightened pleading, which
generally requires the plaintiff to plead with particularity facts
supporting the claim or some element thereof.25 Heightened
pleading applies in only two situations: when required by the
statute under which the claim is brought 26 or when Rule 9 con-
trols. 2 7 Courts, of their own accord, are not permitted to impose
heightened pleading requirements.28 This should not be sur-
prising, for the Federal Rules are transsubstantive, 29 and
pleading is no exception. 30
Whether this picture accurately reflects pleading practice
among the lower courts through the years is debatable. 31 At
times, the Court itself has suggested that more specific plead-
judicially imposed heightened pleading standards conflict with requirements
of Rule 8 and noting that "federal courts and litigants must rely on summary
judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner
rather than later").
24. 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1357.
25. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 15, at 554-67 (contrasting the require-
ments of notice, fact, and heightened pleading).
26. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 8.04(8)(b) (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that Congress has the power to enact
specific statutory modifications to Rule 8 and in so doing impose heightened
pleading). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 imposes such
requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006) (laying out specific pleading re-
quirements).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Ma-
lice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged
generally.").
28. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in all civil
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts . . . ."); 5A WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 16, § 1332 (describing the "trans-substantive ... system
that is a benchmark of federal practice").
30. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) ("Rule
8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions .... ); 5 WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 16, §§ 1204, 1221.
31. For a survey of federal court pleading practices that complicate the
notion of notice pleading as the operative regime, see Christopher M. Fairman,
The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 998-1011 (2003); Richard
L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1749, 1754-65, 1771 (1998).
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ings are required. 32 But, until recently, first in Twombly and
then in Iqbal, it had never abandoned the language of notice
pleading.33
B. BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY AND THE INTRODUCTION
OF PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING
Twombly was a putative class action brought on behalf of
all purchasers of local telephone or high-speed internet-servic-
es. 34 The plaintiffs alleged that Verizon, BellSouth, Qwest, and
SBC had conspired to restrain trade in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, thereby allowing them to charge beholden
consumers inflated prices.35
From 1984 and the break-up of AT&T until 1996, the de-
fendants, known as Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(ILECs), enjoyed government-sanctioned monopoly power in
their respective regional telecommunications markets, but were
subject to extensive regulation and prohibited from competing
in other local markets or the long-distance telephone market. 36
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 changed all of this.37 De-
signed to open the local telecommunications market to competi-
tion, the Act required ILECs to facilitate the entry of Competi-
tive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) into the market by
making available their infrastructure at beneficial rates.38 In
return, the ILECs would henceforth be allowed to compete in
other regional markets and the long-distance market. 39 Despite
Congress's wishes, the structure of the local telephone services
32. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (purport-
ing to apply the minimal requirements of notice pleading but dismissing the
complaint for failure to provide notice with regard to one element of plaintiff's
securities fraud claim).
33. Id.
34. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1958 (2007).
35. Id. at 1962-63; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (prohibiting "[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce").
36. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961, 1962 n.1. Together, the defendants con-
trolled more than ninety percent of the local telecommunications market. Id.
at 1962 n.1. The structure of the local telephone services market was shaped
by its unique history. After the divestiture of AT&T, itself the result of anti-
trust action, seven ILECs were formed. Through a series of mergers, the seven
ILECs combined to become the four named defendants. Id. at 1961-62 & n.1.
37. See id. at 1961.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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market remained largely unchanged, which gave rise to the
plaintiffs' suit.40
Because section 1 does not reach independent behavior, no
matter how unreasonable, the existence of an agreement is es-
sential.41 Lacking direct evidence of conspiracy, the plaintiffs in
Twombly based their claims on two patterns of parallel beha-
vior.4 2 First, the defendants engaged in a course of parallel
conduct to prevent CLECs from entering their respective mar-
kets.43 Second, the defendants collectively failed to enter each
other's contiguous markets as CLECs, thereby foregoing attrac-
tive business opportunities. 44
After the Second Circuit reversed the district court's dis-
missal of the claim,45 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
answer the question of what a complaint based on parallel con-
duct must contain to state a claim under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.4 6 Justice Souter's opinion, joined by six other Justices,
began its analysis by laying out the controlling principles of an-
titrust law, emphasizing the problems that attend attempts to
prove agreement through parallel conduct and the correspond-
ing steps the Court had taken throughout the trial sequence to
hedge against false inferences.4 7 Turning to the requirements of
Rule 8, the Court began by citing Conley's notice standard, but
then proceeded to stress that, by its terms, Rule 8 also requires
the complaint to make a showing of the grounds entitling the
40. See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 177-78 (S.D.N.Y.
2003), vacated, 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
41. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768
(1984); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (not-
ing that section 1 rests on a "basic distinction between concerted and indepen-
dent action").
42. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1970-71. It is well-established that paral-
lel behavior is circumstantial evidence from which a conspiracy may be in-
ferred in some circumstances. E.g., Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954); Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v.
Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 53 (3d Cir. 2007).
43. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1962-63.
44. Id. at 1962.
45. See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 106, 117-19 (2d Cir.
2005), rev'd 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (holding that dismissal of a complaint that
included conspiracy among the plausible possibilities was proper only if the
plaintiffs could marshal "no set of facts" demonstrating collusive as opposed to
independent action). The Court of Appeals defined "plausib[ility]" as "superfi-
cially worthy of belief: CREDIBLE." Id. at 111 n.5 (quoting Mendoza Manim-
bao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 664 (9th Cir. 2003)).
46. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1963.
47. Id. at 1964.
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plaintiff to relief.48 This standard does not require detailed fac-
tual allegations, but taking the allegations pleaded as true
"must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level."49
For a section 1 claim, the Court held that these "general
standards" require that the complaint contain "enough factual
matter ... to suggest that an agreement was made."50 Put dif-
ferently, the allegations must render the claim of conspiracy
plausible.51 Importantly, said the Court, plausibility is not an
invitation for judges to engage in probabilistic reasoning to
weed out improbable, but well-pleaded complaints. 52 Even with
this caveat, plausibility conflicts with the metaphysical possi-
bility that Conley treated as sufficient to withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.53 As such, the Court "retire[d]" Con-
ley's "no set of facts" language, 54 reasoning that such a stan-
dard dispenses with Rule 8's requirement that a complaint
show entitlement to relief.55 Despite this somewhat dramatic
shift, the Court rejected the argument that asking for plausible
grounds from which to infer a conspiracy amounted to heigh-
tened pleading because it did not require allegations of specific
facts.56
Applying the plausibility standard to the facts before it, the
Court held that dismissal was appropriate because the plain-
48. Id. at 1964-65; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2) (using the language:
"showing ... entitle[ment] to relief").
49. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
50. Id.
51. Id. But for a few examples, the Court declined to specify what exactly
in addition to parallel conduct would push a plaintiff's complaint across the
line to plausible. Id. at 1965 & n.4, 1966.
52. Id. at 1965.
53. Id. at 1968.
54. Id. at 1969.
55. See id. at 1968-69. The Court further justified the importance of
showing entitlement to relief and its section 1 specific manifestation as the
plausibility requirement on two grounds. First, there is a need to dispose effi-
ciently of unmeritorious claims used to extract settlements. Id. at 1966.
Second, both the scope and expense of antitrust discovery, along with the po-
tential for abuse, place a premium on disposing quickly of groundless claims.
Id. at 1966-67. Neither careful case management nor summary judgment, the
Court found, is up to the task, for the latter follows discovery, and discovery
predicated on minimal knowledge cannot help but be expansive. See id. at
1967; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635,
638-39 (1989).
56. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 & n.14, 1974.
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tiffs' allegations did not suggest an agreement.57 In analyzing
the complaint, the Court found that the claim of conspiracy
rested solely on the defendants' parallel behavior.5 8 But such
allegations, standing alone, did not suggest a conspiracy.5 9 In
light of "common economic experience" and the unique struc-
ture of the local telecommunications market, the defendants'
actions were just as likely the result of natural business deci-
sions made independently.60 As such, dismissal was appropri-
ate.61
Widespread confusion followed in the wake of Twombly.62
Courts and commentators alike struggled to determine the ap-
plicability and meaning of the plausibility standard and its re-
lation to notice pleading.63 Many observed that the Supreme
Court would have to address pleading standards again, and
soon.64 Two years later, it did.
C. ASHCROFT V. IQBAL
Ashcroft v. Iqbal concerned a Bivens action brought by Ja-
vid Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim detained as part of the post-9/11
57. Id. at 1973-74.
58. Id. at 1970-71. Absent such an allegation, said the Court, the com-
plaint would have likely failed for lack of notice. Id. at 1970 n. 10.
59. Id. at 1970-73.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1974.
62. E.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)
("We are not alone in finding the opinion confusing."); McMahon, supra note 2,
at 858 (explaining that the district courts have been thrown into "disarray").
63. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) ("The
most difficult question in interpreting Twombly is what the Court means by
'plausibility."'); 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1216 (Supp. 2009)
("[C]ourts continue to struggle with the meaning of 'plausibility' . . . ."); Doug-
las G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1088 (2009)
(expressing the same concern). Compounding the confusion was Erickson v.
Pardus, a per curiam decision issued just two weeks after Twombly that va-
cated the dismissal of a prisoner's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims
for cruel and unusual punishment and affirmed the primacy of notice pleading
without any mention of plausibility. Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2198,
2200 (2007) (per curiam).
64. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 ("The issues raised by Twombly are not easi-
ly resolved, and likely will be a source of controversy for years to come."); Mi-
chael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal Courts,
Again, FINDLAW, Aug. 13, 2007, http://practice.findlaw.comflaw-practice
-management-articles/00006/000312.html ("What is clear is that the Supreme
Court will soon have to revisit the question of pleading standards to resolve
the ambiguity that Twombly created.").
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investigation into persons with suspected ties to terrorism.65
Following his arrest, Iqbal was designated a person of "high in-
terest,"6 6 held in highly restrictive conditions and allegedly sub-
jected to abusive treatment.67 Upon release and deportation,
Iqbal filed suit, alleging that John Ashcroft, the former Attor-
ney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, the Di-
rector of the FBI, deprived him of his constitutional rights by
instituting a policy pursuant to which he was designated a per-
son of "high interest" and subjected to harsh conditions of con-
finement solely because of his "religion, race, and/or national
origin."68
In response, Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, raising the defense of qualified immun-
ity.69 On interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit, in an opinion
issued shortly after Twombly, affirmed the district court's
denial of Ashcroft's and Mueller's motions to dismiss. 70 The
Second Circuit interpreted the recently announced plausibility
standard to require "factual amplification" in "those contexts
where such amplification is needed to render a claim plausi-
ble." 71 Concluding that this was not such a situation, the
Second Circuit held that Iqbal's complaint could proceed. 72 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether Iqbal had
pled enough factual matter to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.73
As in Twombly, the Court (in an opinion by Justice Kenne-
dy, who was joined by four other Justices) framed its analysis
in terms of the controlling principles of the relevant substan-
tive law.7 4 Under the case law interpreting and applying § 1983
and Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, govern-
65. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
66. Id. at 1943-44.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1942, 1944.
69. Id. at 1943-45.
70. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 177 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
71. Id. at 157-58.
72. See id. at 166 ("It is arguable that, under the plausibility standard of
Bell Atlantic, some subsidiary facts must be alleged to plead adequately that
Ashcroft and Mueller condoned the Plaintiff's continued confine-
ment .... However, all of the Plaintiff's allegations respecting the personal
involvement of these Defendants are entirely plausible, without allegations of
additional subsidiary facts.").
73. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942-43.
74. Id. at 1947.
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ment officials cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of
their subordinates. 75 Thus, a plaintiff must establish that each
defendant individually violated the plaintiff's constitutional
rights.76 When the claim is unconstitutional discrimination,
this means that the "plaintiff must plead and prove" that the
challenged course of conduct was undertaken "because of, not
merely in spite of, the action's adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group."7 7
With this groundwork in place, the Court then elaborated
on the plausibility pleading standard set forth in Twombly.
Two principles, the Court explained, underlie that decision.
First, on a motion to dismiss, courts are not required to accept
as true legal conclusions and conclusory allegations. 78 Second,
only plausible claims, regardless of the substantive law they
invoke,79 will survive a motion to dismiss.80
Determining whether a claim is plausible is a "context-
specific task" requiring the exercise of "judicial experience and
common sense."81 But the standard is not met when a com-
plaint merely parrots the elements of a cause of action or when
its well-pleaded facts raise only the possibility of liability.82 In-
stead, a complaint's "factual content" must allow the court "to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged."83
The Court then suggested a two-step approach for assess-
ing a claim's plausibility.84 In step one, the court identifies
75. Id. at 1948.
76. Id.
77. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In reaching this
result, the Court rejected as inconsistent with the lack of vicarious liability the
plaintiff's attempt to use a theory of supervisory liability, under which Ash-
croft and Mueller could be held liable for their knowledge of and acquiescence
in the purposely discriminatory actions of their subordinates. Id. at 1949.
78. Id. at 1949-50.
79. Id. at 1953 ('Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a com-
plaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and
application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard 'in all
civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.' Our decision
in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions,' and it ap-
plies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike." (citations omitted)).
80. Id. at 1950.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1949-50.
83. Id. at 1949.
84. Id. at 1950. But see id. at 1959-61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority misapplied the plausibility standard by discrediting allega-
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those pleadings that are merely conclusions and thus not en-
titled to the assumption of truth.85 In step two, the court asks
whether the remaining well-pleaded allegations, accepted as
true, "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."86
Following this methodological approach, the Court's analy-
sis of Iqbal's complaint first identified the allegations-that
Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully and ma-
liciously agreed to" a policy that subjected Iqbal to "harsh con-
ditions of confinement" because of his race, religion, or national
origin and that the two were respectively the "principal archi-
tect" of this policy and "instrumental" in its adoption and im-
plementation-which were not entitled to the assumption of
truth because of their conclusory nature.87 Such "bare asser-
tions," reasoned the Court, were no more than "a 'formulaic re-
citation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination
claim," which, after Twombly, cannot be accepted as true.88
Second, the Court considered whether Iqbal's remaining
well-pleaded factual allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller
suggested a plausible entitlement to relief.89 According to Iqbal,
the FBI, under the direction of Mueller, "arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men ... as part of its investigation
of the events of September 11."90 Iqbal also alleged that Muel-
ler and Ashcroft approved the policy of holding such detainees
in highly restrictive conditions until they were cleared by the
FBI.e' The Court held that these allegations, taken as true, did
not state a plausible claim, a conclusion with which the four
dissenting Justices agreed. 92 Although the allegations were
consistent with purposeful discrimination, in light of more like-
tions that were not "naked legal conclusions" and failing to consider the com-
plaint as a whole).
85. Id. at 1950 (majority opinion).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1950-52 ("[W]e do not reject these bald allegations on the
ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical.... It is the conclusory nature
of respondent's allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature,
that disentitles them to the presumption of truth."). But see id. at 1961 (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting) (disputing this conclusion).
88. Id. at 1951 (majority opinion) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1944.
91. Id. at 1951.
92. Id. at 1951-52; id. at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ly lawful explanations, 93 "discrimination [was] not a plausible
conclusion."94 Thus, the Court concluded that Iqbal had failed
"to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and un-
lawful discrimination."95
After Iqbal, it is clear that the plausibility standard can-
not, as some had argued, 96 be confined to the antitrust context,
but this was never really in doubt.97 It is a general pleading
standard, one that requires allegations of at least some facts.
Going forward, the two central issues in analyzing the suffi-
ciency of a complaint will be: (1) whether the allegations are
conclusory or nonconclusory98 and (2) whether the nonconclu-
sory allegations state a plausible claim.
93. Id. at 1951 (majority opinion) ("It should come as no surprise that a
legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, inci-
dental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to
target neither Arabs nor Muslims.").
94. Id. at 1951-52.
95. Id. at 1954.
96. See generally Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans
Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15-17 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards
Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COL-
LOQUY 117, 117 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/
2007/31/LRColl2007n3lBradley.pdf; Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle
of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): To-
ward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 632
(2007).
97. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1216 (Supp. 2009) ("[Mlost of
the decisions citing the case have been applying its pleading guidelines broad-
ly to Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6) motions, regardless of the legal context.").
98. After Iqbal this distinction will have potentially dispositive conse-
quences for a plaintiff's complaint. It is thus unfortunate that Twombly and
Iqbal appear to take different approaches to this step. Twombly suggested that
wholly conclusory complaints, devoid of any factual allegations, were insuffi-
cient. See Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 & n.3 (2007)
(indicating that a modicum of facts is required to ensure adequate notice, if
nothing else). Likewise, under Twombly, a plaintiff cannot turn inadequate
factual allegations (parallel business conduct) into a valid claim by coupling
them with an assertion of wrongdoing (agreement, but resting entirely on the
allegations of parallel conduct). Id. at 1963-64, 1970-71 & nn.9-11. Iqbal, by
contrast, goes further, suggesting that a court may analyze a complaint allega-
tion by allegation, determining which are conclusory and so disentitled to the
assumption of truth at the motion to dismiss stage. Compare Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1950-51 (identifying and analyzing Iqbal's individual allegations separately
to determine whether each is conclusory or nonconclusory and endorsing this
approach for all claims), with id. at 1959-60 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explain-
ing that under the plausibility standard allegations, whether conclusory or
not, must be accepted as true unless they "are sufficiently fantastic to defy re-
ality as we know it" and reasoning that "[t]he fallacy of the majority's position
... lies in looking at the relevant assertions in isolation"); Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
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II. ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE PLAUSIBILITY
Lower courts have treated Iqbal as an unproblematic ap-
plication of Twombly. Accordingly, the actual meaning of the
plausibility standard, as opposed to the scope of its applicabili-
ty, remains as important and as unclear as ever. Largely set-
ting aside the issue of whether a complaint's allegations are
conclusory, this Part surveys and critiques the more prominent
definitions of "plausibility" that have been advanced post-
Twombly. It concludes that while they provide guidance in de-
veloping a workable understanding of the plausibility standard,
they are ultimately incomplete.
A. IS THE PLAUSIBILITY INQUIRY STILL RELEVANT AFTER
IQBAL?
As many courts have noted, a significant aspect of Iqbal is
its introduction of a two-prong analytical approach, the first
step of which is to identify the allegations in a complaint that
are conclusory and so disentitled to the presumption of truth.99
This has led Professor Adam N. Steinman to argue that after
Iqbal "plausibility is not the primary issue when evaluating the
sufficiency of a complaint." 00 Instead, the key issue is whether
a complaint's allegations are conclusory.101 If "a complaint con-
tains non-conclusory allegations on every element of a claim for
relief, the plausibility issue vanishes completely." 0 2 Steinman
concludes that the plausibility inquiry is necessary "only when
a crucial allegation is disregarded as conclusory."103 In many
cases, then, it will not be necessary at all.104
at 1973 n.14 ("[The complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to
render plaintiffs' entitlement to relief plausible."). It is worth flagging this im-
portant issue on which the Supreme Court provided little guidance, but the
remainder of this Note focuses primarily on the meaning of "plausibility" and
addresses the conclusory-nonconclusory distinction only insofar as it is rele-
vant to this primary concern.
99. See, e.g., Borneo Energy Sendirian Berhad v. Sustainable Power
Corp., No. H-09-0612, 2009 WL 2498596, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2009) (ex-
plaining that under Iqbal and Twombly a court is required "to engage in a
two-step analysis" to assess the plausibility of a complaint); Burtch v. Milberg
Factors, Inc., No. 07-556-JJF-LPS, 2009 WL 1529861, at *2 (D. Del. May 31,
2009); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
100. Steinman, supra note 13, at 26.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. at 28.
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id. at 26.
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Steinman is surely right to emphasize the importance of
prong one of Iqbal. After all, when some of a complaint's allega-
tions are deemed conclusory and so discredited, the plausibility
standard will necessarily be harder to meet. Iqbal is illustra-
tive.105 Had his allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller been
credited, dismissal would have been inappropriate, for the
complaint would have adequately alleged all the elements ne-
cessary to sustain recovery for Bivens liability. 06
But it is a mistake to think that the plausibility inquiry
has become secondary or can be bypassed. 07 First, it is not
clear that one can define "conclusory" on the basis of Iqbal and
Twombly in a way that will allow most claims to escape the
plausibility analysis. 08 Second, Iqbal suggests that even a
complaint comprised entirely of nonconclusory allegations must
still surpass a threshold level of plausibility.109 And in many
cases, as where a plaintiff must allege a secret act or a defen-
dant's mental state, only conclusory or indirect allegations will
be possible.110 In such situations, the plausibility analysis will
determine the fate of the claim.
Moreover, placing the analytical emphasis on whether al-
legations are conclusory or nonconclusory is problematic and
ultimately undesirable. As Steinman acknowledges, under this
view, the "crucial question ... is how to assess whether an alle-
gation may be disregarded as conclusory ... ."111 Unfortunate-
ly, drawing this distinction in a precise and easily applicable
105. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-52 (2009).
106. See id. at 1959-60 (Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding that if Iqbal's
allegations were accepted as true, the complaint would meet the plausibility
standard).
107. See id. at 1950 (majority opinion) ("[A] court ... can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth." (emphasis added)).
108. See id. at 1960-61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining how, in light of
the complaint as a whole, Iqbal's allegations were not conclusory, but rather
were tied to specific, clearly identified transactional occurrences).
109. See id. at 1949 (majority opinion) (indicating that, first and foremost,
a claim must be "plausible on its face" (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007))).
110. See Howard Wasserman, More Iqbal: What's a Plaintiff to Do?,
PRAWFSBIAWG, Aug. 25, 2009, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/
08/more-iqbal-whats-a-plaintiff-to-do.html (discussing Moss v. U.S. Secrete
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2009), and explaining the ease with
which courts will find allegations going to a defendant's state of mind conclu-
sory).
111. Steinman, supra note 13, at 6-7.
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way will be exceedingly difficult.112 Indeed, the Court in Iqbal
was divided on whether the plaintiff's allegations were conclu-
sory, but in agreement that the nonconclusory allegations, as
identified by the majority, did not meet the plausibility stan-
dard. 113 What is more, while Steinman offers his analysis in an
attempt to harmonize Iqbal and Twombly with prior, more lib-
eral pleading cases, thereby limiting their potentially restric-
tive effects, 114 embracing the conclusory-nonconclusory distinc-
tion risks returning federal pleading practice to the repudiated
technicalities of common law and code pleading.115 It also gives
courts, especially in light of the distinction's vague definition,
excessive latitude in identifying certain allegations as conclu-
sory and finding that the rest of the claim is implausible.
Quite apart from the merits of reading Iqbal as refocusing
the pleading inquiry on whether a complaint's allegations are
conclusory, courts have treated Iqbal as consistent with Twom-
bly.11 6 Rather than introducing new concepts, the decision
simply clarifies how concepts established by Twombly are to be
applied.117 Accordingly, plausibility remains the touchstone of
the Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry, and its pre-Iqbal definitions remain
relevant.
B. COURT-CREATED DEFINITIONS OF PLAUSIBILITY
Although plausibility remains essential to the sufficiency of
a complaint, courts have struggled to develop a clear definition
of the standard. Situating a vague and problematic definition
within a two-prong framework, as in Iqbal, does not add any
112. Scott Dodson, Beyond Twombly, CIVIL PROCEDURE & FEDERAL COURTS
BLOG, May 18, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2009/05/beyond-
twombly-by-prof-scott-dodson.htm1 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960-61 (Souter,
J., dissenting)).
113. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's
holding that the statements it selects are conclusory cannot be squared with
its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as nonconclusory.").
114. See Steinman, supra note 13, at 5.
115. See Dodson, supra note 112.
116. E.g., Gonzalez v. Kay, No. 08-20544, 2009 WL 2357015, at *2 (5th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009);
Brown v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08-1890, 2009 WL 1761101, at *1 (7th
Cir. June 23, 2009).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Lloyds TSB Bank, P.L.C., No. 07 Civ. 9235,
2009 WL 2371562, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2009) ("While Iqbal amplifies and
expands upon the Court's reasoning in Twombly, it introduces no new con-
cepts, and neither party in the case at bar has asked leave to discuss Iqbal in a
supplemental brief.").
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clarity to the underlying inquiry. But a survey of the different
approaches adopted by courts, however incomplete they may
be, helps illuminate features that are relevant to correctly un-
derstanding the plausibility standard.
1. Most Courts Fail to Define the Plausibility Standard
Courts were quick to apply the plausibility standard in a
variety of contexts, but they generally failed to define what it
required. Instead, they simply adopted certain key phrases
from Twombly-"a formulaic recitation of the elements . .. will
not do"118 and the right to relief must be more than "conceiva-
ble" or merely speculative' 19-and plugged them into the sec-
tions of their respective opinions laying out pleading stan-
dards. 120 This practice has largely continued post-Iqbal, but
with an increased emphasis on whether the complaint's allega-
tions support an inference of misconduct. 121
There would be no problem if the standard picked out by
these phrases was clear, but it is not.122 As a result, an area of
the law where certainty is to be prized 23 is infected with an
unwelcome degree of uncertainty. 124 With this uncertainty
comes an increase in procedural battles and their attendant
costs.12 5 Moreover, courts will likely continue to develop and
apply divergent standards for assessing the sufficiency of
pleadings,126 which undermines the goal of a uniform procedur-
al system and may promote forum shopping.127 All of this un-
derscores the need for a clear definition of "plausibility."
118. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
119. Id. at 1974.
120. See Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Plead-
ing Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 893, 909 (2008).
121. See, e.g., Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, No. 08-1334, 2009 WL
2749993, at *4-5 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 2009); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., No.
06-15851, 2009 WL 2431463, at *11 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2009) (reciting the re-
levant formulations from Twombly and Iqbal and concluding that the "plain-
tiffs' attenuated chain of conspiracy fails to nudge their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible").
122. See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to
Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
61, 76-77 (2007) ("[T]he ostensible distinction between 'conceivable' to 'plausi-
ble' looks to be fuzzy at birth. . . ."); McMahon, supra note 2, at 864.
123. McMahon, supra note 2, at 869.
124. Spencer, supra note 12, at 10.
125. Id. at 26; see Ward, supra note 120, at 915-16.
126. Spencer, supra note 12, at 26.
127. McMahon, supra note 2, at 867.
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2. The Third Circuit Approach
The Third Circuit has read the plausibility standard, both
before and after Iqbal, through the lens of notice pleading, but
has failed to satisfactorily explain the relationship between no-
tice and plausibility. 1 2 8 Stating a plausible claim, however,
simply "requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken
as true) to suggest the required element."129 Proof of the re-
quired element need not be probable, but the complaint must
contain enough facts to suggest that discovery will reveal re-
lated evidence.o30 By attaching plausibility to the elements of
the claim, the implication is that every element must meet the
plausibility standard.131 Thus, while the Third Circuit has sug-
gested that the plausibility standard is a minimal one,132 its
formulation, if followed literally, may require more detailed fac-
tual pleading.
3. The Tenth Circuit Approach
Like the Third Circuit, the Tenth Circuit connects the
plausibility standard with notice of the grounds of a claim, but
it has said more about the actual meaning of "plausibility." Re-
cognizing that the plausibility standard cannot concern the li-
kelihood that the complaint's allegations are true, the court in
Robbins v. Oklahoma defined "plausibility" in light of the scope
of the allegations. 33 If the allegations "are so general that they
128. See, e.g., Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, No. 07-4285, 2009 WL 2501662,
at *6 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2009) ("Under the 'plausibility paradigm' . . . these
averments are sufficient to give [the defendant] notice of the basis for [the
plaintiff's] claim." (quoting Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., 522
F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008))); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
233-34 (3d Cir. 2008).
129. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Fowler, 2009 WL 2501662, at *5.
130. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1965 (2007)).
131. See, e.g., In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig., 566 F.
Supp. 2d 363, 370 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (fitting the plausibility standard, as defined
by Phillips, into the traditional definition of substantive sufficiency, i.e., facts
constituting a cause of action).
132. See Fowler, 2009 WL 2501662, at *6 (indicating that so long as a com-
plaint contains some factual matter and provides adequate notice, it will sur-
vive a motion to dismiss).
133. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008); see also
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (explaining that Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals cannot be "based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's fac-
tual allegations" and that "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it ap-
pears 'that recovery is very remote and unlikely"' (citing Neitzke v. Williams,
522 [ 94: 505
THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," then
the complaint is merely conceivable, not plausible. 134 To be
plausible, "the complaint must give the court reason to believe
that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering fac-
tual support for these claims."135 What suffices to meet this re-
quirement depends on context.136 The Tenth Circuit is likely
correct to note that as the breadth of lawful behavior described
by the complaint increases, the need for more factual allega-
tions suggesting liability increases. Without further elabora-
tion, however, it is difficult to know what exactly is required by
the plausibility standard in any given case.
4. The Plausibility Standard as a Sliding-Scale
Many courts, perhaps most notably the Second 3 7 and Se-
venth Circuits,138 have treated plausibility, even after Iqbal,139
as a flexible standard or a sliding-scale.14 0 Although the plausi-
bility standard must be satisfied in every case, the amount of
"factual amplification" needed to cross this threshold will vary
depending on the claim.141 The Second Circuit, however, has
failed to explain when such "factual amplification" is required
or how much is needed, which necessarily limits the utility of
such an approach.142
490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974))); cf.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
134. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247.
135. Id. (quoting Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174,
1177 (10th Cir. 2007)).
136. Id. at 1248 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231-
32 (3d Cir. 2008)) (explaining that simple claims, such as for negligence based
on an automobile accident, require less than complex claims, such as those
based on wide swaths of perfectly legal behavior, or those where, as a matter
of policy, there is an interest in resolving some aspect of the litigation before
discovery).
137. See Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008); Iqbal v. Has-
ty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
138. See Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008); Li-
mestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803-04 (7th Cir. 2008).
139. See, e.g., Sebast v. Mahan, No. 09-cv-98, 2009 WL 2256949, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. July 28, 2009); Bilal v. Wolf, No. 06 C 6978, 2009 WL 1871676, at *1
(N.D. Ill. June 25, 2009).
140. Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of "General Rules,"
2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 548.
141. See, e.g., Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157-58.
142. See Boykin, 521 F.3d at 214 (noting the lack of guidance "regarding
when factual 'amplification [is] needed to render [a] claim plausible"' (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158)). But see McMahon, supra
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The Seventh Circuit avoids this failing by connecting the
amount and specificity of the factual allegations required to the
potential cost of discovery. 143 In simple cases, and those cases
that do not impose a risk of forcing settlement consequent of
potential litigation expenses, the standard is minimal.144 But in
complex litigation where the scale of discovery may force set-
tlement, a greater factual showing is required to meet the thre-
shold of plausibility. 14 5 Regardless of the context, though, notice
remains the touchstone of pleading and the dominant metric
for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint in the Seventh Cir-
cuit. 146 Thus, the easily satisfied requirement of notice tempers
the potential bite of the plausibility standard. 147
Post-Iqbal, the Seventh Circuit continues to adhere to this
approach. Brooks v. Ross considered Iqbal's potential effect on
its post-Twombly pleading jurisprudence and concluded that
Iqbal simply affirms Twombly's general applicability and ad-
monishes plaintiffs to provide some facts in their complaints to
ensure that they are not "abstract recitations" of law, which a
court need not accept as true.148 Similarly, in Smith v. Duffey,
the court suggested that, even after Iqbal, plausibility remains
note 2, at 863 (suggesting that the Second Circuit standard "requires more fac-
tual detail in complaints that allege more complex theories of liability. . .").
143. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1083; see also Marcus, supra note 10, at 68 ("As
the anticipated costs of litigation, however defined, rise, the plaintiffs' obliga-
tion to include more particularized obligations does as well.").
144. Cf. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084 ("Bell Atlantic's explicit praise of Form 9
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure illustrates that conclusory statements
are not barred entirely from federal pleadings."); Airborne Beepers & Video,
Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Taking Erick-
son and Twombly together, we understand the Court to be saying only that at
some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the com-
plaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the defendant is
entitled under Rule 8.").
145. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1083; Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont,
520 F.3d 797, 803-04 (7th Cir. 2008).
146. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1083 ("Although the opinion contains some lan-
guage that could be read to suggest otherwise, the Court in Bell Atlantic made
clear that it did not, in fact, supplant the basic notice-pleading standard.");
Lang v. TCF Nat'l Bank, 249 F. App'x 464, 466 (7th Cir. 2007).
147. Limestone, 520 F.3d at 803 ("Bell Atlantic must not be overread. The
Court denied . . . 'requir[ing] heightened fact pleading of specifics' .... (alte-
ration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974
(2007))); see also Maxie v. Wal-Mart, No. 3:09-CV-260, 2009 WL 1766686, at *2
(N.D. Ind. June 19, 2009) (acknowledging the ongoing force of this admonition,
even after Iqbal).




tied to the cost of pretrial discovery and its potential to force a
settlement. 149
While the Seventh Circuit's approach improves on the
Second Circuit's, it is not without problems. First, insofar as
the requirements of notice and plausibility are independent,150
it is not clear how the former can be used to limit the latter.'5 '
Second, although connecting a greater factual showing at the
pleading stage with the potential size, expense, and burden of
discovery finds some support in both Twombly and Iqbal,152 the
latter can be read to foreclose such an approach. Iqbal's refusal
to relax the requirements of Rule 8 in light of the promise of
cabined discovery suggests that the potential expense of discov-
ery is independent of the plausibility inquiry.153 Third, cases
where discovery is likely to be too expensive may also be those
where it is needed most because of the defendant's monopoly on
the relevant information. 154 In such situations, it seems partic-
ularly unfair to ask plaintiffs to know and plead what they
cannot know.155
More fundamentally, even though a flexible definition of
the plausibility standard helps reconcile the results in Twom-
bly and Iqbal with the succinctness of Form 11,156 it does not
help define "plausibility." Consequently, all of the problems dis-
cussed in Part II.B.1 apply to a flexible standard as well. More-
over, introducing additional factors for judges to consider in-
creases the complexity of what is supposed to be a simple
procedural system.15 7 As the number of factors to be considered
149. Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th Cir. 2009) (expressing
skepticism about the reach of Twombly and noting that "Iqbal is special in its
own way" because of the unique role of qualified immunity).
150. See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards,
158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 23-24), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1351994,
151. See Spencer, supra note 12, at 19.
152. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953-54 (2009) (connecting the
need for a plausibility standard with the burdens and distractions imposed by
discovery); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966-67 (2007); Spenc-
er, supra note 12, at 33-38.
153. See id.; see also Spencer, supra note 12, at 36 ("[W]hether discovery is
expected to cost $1 million or $10 million does not, strictly speaking, bear on
whether the plausibility threshold has been surpassed.").
154. See McMahon, supra note 2, at 867.
155. Id.
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11.
157. See Ward, supra note 120, at 909.
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increases, so does the potential for variation among the courts,
which itself creates further uncertainty for litigants.158
C. PLAUSIBILITY AS PLEADING ELEMENTS, DIRECTLY OR
INFERENTIALLY
Some commentators define the plausibility standard as re-
quiring allegations for each of the material elements necessary
to establish liability under some legal theory.15 9 There are two
versions of this definition, which can be described as the weak
version and the strong version. Under the weak version the
standard is construed liberally and a plaintiff is not required to
allege specific facts for each element. 60 So long as the com-
plaint's allegations touch, however inferentially or conclusorily,
on the requisite elements, the standard is met.161 By contrast,
the strong version requires nonconclusory factual allegations
for each material element of the claim.162
The problem underlying both of these approaches is that
the plausibility standard measures the adequacy of the allega-
tions in support of a claim.163 It does not simply require that
158. See McMahon, supra note 2, at 864.
159. See Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing After Bell Corp. v.
Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 22-23 (2008) (arguing that the plausibility standard
should be interpreted as requiring "factual allegations in plain language
touching (either directly or by inference) all material elements necessary to
recover under substantive law"); Smith, supra note 63, at 1088 ("The central
theme of the plausibility standard is logical coherence. . . . [Under logical cohe-
rence,) plaintiffs' allegations [must] contain a set of factual assertions that, if
taken as true, are both necessary and sufficient to establish defendants' liabil-
ity.").
160. See Campbell, supra note 159, at 25-28.
161. See id.; see also Hairston v. Geren, No. C-08-382, 2009 WL 2207181, at
*2, *4 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 2009) (deeming, post-Iqbal, conclusory allegations in
a discrimination case sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment
on the pleadings-which applies the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion-even though the complaint did "not contain an overabundance of facts to
support [the plaintiff's] claims"); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly:
A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1042-47) (arguing for a proposed pleading framework for
Title VII employment discrimination cases under which a plaintiff must al-
lege, in concise and general terms, the material elements of the offense as de-
fined by the statute's language).
162. See Smith, supra note 63, at 1089-90; see also Kendall v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring plaintiffs to plead not
just ultimate facts-such as a conspiracy-but evidentiary facts which, if true,
would prove the cause of action).
163. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of
Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 882 (2009) (distinguishing between the
elements that must be alleged and the adequacy of allegations in support of
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such allegations exist.164 After all, the plaintiffs in Twombly,
both directly and indirectly, alleged an agreement, 165 just as
Iqbal alleged purposeful discrimination. 1 6 6 In both cases, how-
ever, the Court held that the factual allegations failed to satisfy
the plausibility standard because they did not support an infe-
rence of the asserted misconduct. 67 A further problem faced by
the strong version is that it seems irreconcilable with the
Forms accompanying the Federal Rules,s68 which by definition
state plausible claims.s69 Of course a complaint that adequately
alleges, directly or inferentially, each of the material elements
necessary to sustain recovery will survive a motion to dismiss,
but stated thusly the proposition says little about the meaning
of "plausibility," which remains the central issue.
D. PLAUSIBILITY IN RELATION TO AN ORDINARY STATE OF
AFFAIRS
Professors A. Benjamin Spencer and Robert G. Bone have
both analyzed the plausibility standard in relation to the ordi-
nary state of affairs.170 According to Spencer, the plausibility
standard is a factual sufficiency standard that "significantly
raises the pleading bar" from where notice pleading had it orig-
inally set.171 In an attempt to move beyond the indeterminate
concepts generally used to define "plausibility," Spencer has
those elements and explaining that Twombly and the plausibility standard
deal with the latter).
164. See id. at 888 (concluding that "plausibility" cannot be equated with
pleading elements because the plaintiffs in Twombly did allege an agreement).
But see Epstein, supra note 122, at 66 (suggesting the ease with which the re-
quired elements of a Sherman Act section 1 violation are alleged).
165. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1962, 1970-71 (2007). But
see id. at 1984-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("mhe theory on which the Court
permits dismissal is that, so far as the Federal Rules are concerned, no agree-
ment has been alleged at all. This is a mind-boggling conclusion.").
166. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009) (holding that Iqbal's
direct allegations were insufficient because they were conclusory and the re-
maining factual allegations did not support the desired inference).
167. Id.; Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965-66, 1971-73 (looking for but not find-
ing plausible grounds from which to infer an unlawful agreement).
168. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. Forms 11, 12, 15; see also Bone, supra note
163, at 886, 888 (noting Form 11's "skeletal" nature).
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 ("The forms in the Appendix suffice under these
rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.").
170. Bone, supra note 163, at 888 ("[P]Iausibility [is correctly associated]
with allegations that differ from an ordinary state of affairs. ); Spencer,
supra note 12, at 13-18.
171. Spencer, supra note 6, at 445-46.
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advanced a descriptive framework for determining whether a
complaint's factual allegations are sufficient to withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 172
To satisfy the plausibility standard, argues Spencer, a
complaint must "describe events about which there is a pre-
sumption of impropriety."173 Factual scenarios possessing a pre-
sumption of impropriety "convey some sense of specific wrong-
doing in the eyes of the law."17 4 By contrast, scenarios that
ordinarily have lawful explanations enjoy a presumption of
propriety; they are "neutral with respect to wrongdoing."17 5 To
state a plausible claim, a complaint must create a presumption
of impropriety through the allegation of "objective facts" 76 and
"supported implications,"177 not just "speculative supposi-
tions."178 On this view, the amount of facts that must be alleged
depends on whether the claim requires suppositions beyond ob-
jective factual allegations to connote wrongdoing.179
Although he advocates a similar approach, Bone criticizes
Spencer's idea of a presumption of impropriety as "confusing,"
arguing that it fails to "explain clearly how to tell whether a set
of allegations 'suggests wrongdoing' strongly enough to meet
the standard."180 To clarify the matter, Bone proposes the idea
of a baseline. A "baseline" is "the normal state of affairs for sit-
uations of the same general type as those described in the com-
plaint."181 The plausibility standard serves to screen out claims
based on allegations that "describe a state of affairs that is not
merely consistent with lawful [conduct], but fits neatly within
the normal baseline of conduct expected from [the defen-
172. Spencer, supra note 12, at 5-6.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id. at 14-15 (suggesting a negligence claim resulting from an automo-
bile accident or allegations of a breach of contract as examples of scenarios na-
turally possessing a presumption of impropriety).
175. Id. at 15-16.
176. See id. at 14 (defining "objective facts" as those that are "observed or
experienced" and concern what actually transpired in the world, one might
say, rather than what was going on in someone's head).
177. Id. at 17 (explaining that "supported implications" are objective facts
that suggest the desired supposition).
178. Id. at 16 (describing "suppositions" or "speculative suppositions" as
reasons or explanations, perhaps going to the defendant's mental state, offered
by the plaintiff to explain the defendant's conduct).
179. Id. at 34-35.
180. Bone, supra note 163, at 888.
181. Id. at 885.
[94:505528
THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
dant]."182 An allegation that only describes baseline conduct is
implausible, for it is unlikely that society would tolerate
wrongdoing as the ordinary state of affairs. 183
On this view, "plausibility" refers "to the strength of the in-
ference" from the factual allegations, assuming they are true,
"to [a] necessary factual conclusion." 18 4 A plausible inference is
more than merely possible, but not as strong as a probable infe-
rence. 186 Where, precisely, between these two poles plausibility
should be located is unclear. 86 Bone argues, in apparent con-
trast to Spencer, that Twombly indicates 'plausibility' should
not be interpreted as a demanding standard[],"'187 and that it
only "requires. . . allegations that differ in some significant
way from what usually occurs in the baseline and differ in a
way that supports a higher probability of wrongdoing than is
ordinarily associated with baseline conduct." 88
Spencer and Bone are surely right to draw a distinction be-
tween situations that inherently or naturally suggest wrong-
doing or deviate from a baseline, for example, an automobile
accident, and those that do not necessarily suggest wrongdoing,
at least without additional information, such as an antitrust
conspiracy based on parallel conduct.189 In this respect, their
analyses dovetail with and expand upon the approach taken by
the Tenth Circuit in Robbins.190 The central problem facing
such accounts is the uncertainty surrounding the quantum of
facts-after Iqbal, it is clear that legal conclusions will not
do' 91-needed to turn an equivocal complaint into one that ac-
182. Id. at 884-85.
183. Id. at 885.
184. Id. at 881.
185. Id. at 881 & n.42.
186. Id. at 881 & n.42, 882 ("What Twombly actually says about this issue
is difficult to determine because the Court sends seemingly inconsistent mes-
sages on the subject.").
187. Id. at 883-84.
188. Id. at 885-86. Bone has since argued that Iqbal represents an unde-
sirable break from Twombly in that it uses the plausibility standard as a sig-
nificantly more demanding device for screening not just meritless suits, but
weak suits as well. Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Re-
vised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 3, 24-25), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467799.
189. Bone, supra note 163, at 885-86; Spencer, supra note 12, at 14-16.
190. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (ex-
plaining that when a complaint's allegations suggest a wide range of perfectly
legal behavior, more is required).
191. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-51 (2009).
2009] 529
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tually suggests wrongdoing, whether understood as a presump-
tion of impropriety or deviation from a baseline.192 Ultimately,
a fuller account of the plausibility paradigm is needed.
III. "PLAUSIBILITY' PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD
The plausibility standard is best understood as an inferen-
tial standard unrelated to notice that is used to assess the
substantive sufficiency of a complaint. Because of ambiguous
language and conflicting signals from the Court in both Twom-
bly and Iqbal, it might appear to impose a stringent merits de-
termination at the pleading stage. Reading Twombly and Iqbal
in connection with other pleading cases shows that this is not
so. Plausibility is in fact a minimal standard, requiring only
that the complaint give the court reason to believe the claim
should proceed. In light of the low threshold it sets, courts
should be hesitant to use it to dismiss any but the most tenuous
claims.
A. THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD MEASURES THE SUBSTANTIVE
SUFFICIENCY OF A COMPLAINT, NOT THE ADEQUACY OF THE
NOTICE IT PROVIDES
1. Notice and Plausibility Are Independent
Conspicuously absent from Iqbal's discussion of pleading
standards was any mention of notice.193 In many respects this
alone represents a sea change in pleading jurisprudence.19 4
Nevertheless, this should not be altogether surprising, for the
plausibility standard measures the substantive sufficiency of a
complaint, which is unrelated to the adequacy of the notice it
provides.
To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must
be both formally and substantively sufficient. 95 Formal suffi-
192. See generally Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 141-42 (2007), http:/Ivirginia
lawreview.org/inbriefl2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (explaining that the amount and
type of facts needed to meet the plausibility standard is difficult to discern).
193. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-52; see also Dodson, supra note 112 (suggest-
ing that after Iqbal "[n]otice is now an aside"). Also missing were citations to
pleading cases besides Twombly. Dodson, supra note 150, at 23 (commenting
that Iqbal relied "exclusively on Twombly").
194. See Dodson, supra note 150, at 25 (explaining that together Twombly
and Iqbal achieve a "shift in pleadings jurisprudence from notice to facts," and
in so doing, overturn what had been the hallmark of pleading).
195. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th
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ciency concerns the amount of detail required by Rule 8(a)(2) to
ensure that the complaint contains enough information to pro-
vide adequate notice. 196 Substantive sufficiency, by contrast,
concerns legal merit, focusing on whether the complaint's alle-
gations provide grounds for relief.197 Because a complaint must
meet both of these requirements, it has always been misleading
to speak of "notice pleading."198 Providing notice has tradition-
ally been understood as the primary purpose of pleadings under
the Rules,s99 but the sufficiency of a complaint has never risen
or fallen on the sufficiency of notice alone.200
Neither Twombly nor Iqbal was concerned with formal suf-
ficiency. Indeed, Twombly affirmed the standard for measuring
the adequacy of notice that has been in place since Conley201 -a
result which Iqbal did not purport to upset.202 Rather, the issue
in both cases was the substantive sufficiency of the com-
plaint.203 It was in this context that the plausibility standard
was announced and applied.204
Distinguishing between formal and substantive sufficiency
is a basic point, but it is important because formal sufficiency is
unrelated to substantive sufficiency. 205 Accordingly, the notice-
giving function of Rule 8 cannot, as some courts have sug-
Cir. 1999) (explaining that the formal requirements of Rule 8 are different
from the substantive or legal requirements and that both must be met to sur-
vive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
60 (2004); Ides, supra note 96, at 605-06.
196. See ROWE ET AL., supra note 195, at 60; A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 434 (2007).
197. See ROWE ET AL., supra note 195, at 60; SPENCER, supra note 196, at
434.
198. See Ides, supra note 96, at 611-12 (describing the label "notice plead-
ing" as "inapt" because the adequacy of notice has nothing to do with substan-
tive sufficiency).
199. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1202.
200. See Kirksey, 168 F.3d at 1041 ("Where the plaintiff has gone astray is
in supposing that a complaint which complies with Rule 8(a)(2) is immune
from a motion to dismiss.").
201. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007); see also
Ides, supra note 96, at 609.
202. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009); see also Dodson,
supra note 112 (suggesting that after Iqbal "[niotice is now an aside").
203. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942-43; Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-66; see also
Ides, supra note 96, at 619.
204. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69 (replacing Conley's "no set of
facts" standard with the plausibility standard).
205. See, e.g., Ides, supra note 96, at 610 ("[W]hether a claim is legally cog-
nizable is, quite simply, not measured by the adequacy of the notice.").
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gested,206 limit the force with which the plausibility standard
applies. But, importantly, it does not necessarily follow that the
plausibility standard is a demanding factual sufficiency stan-
dard, different in name only from the requirements of code
pleading replaced by the Rules. 207
2. The Plausibility Standard Is an Inferential Standard
Having established that the plausibility standard, at the
highest level of generality, measures the substantive sufficien-
cy of a complaint, it is now necessary to specify with what as-
pect of the complaint the standard is concerned. Despite lan-
guage in some post-Iqbal cases, 2 0 8 plausibility does not concern
the truth of a complaint's factual allegations or the likelihood
that a plaintiff will be able to prove them at trial.209 Instead, it
concerns the viability of an inference. But the issue is compli-
cated because Twombly in particular, but Iqbal also, uses
"plausibility" in at least two different senses. 210 Sometimes the
cases refer to the strength of the inference from the complaint's
factual allegations to a material element of the claim.211 Other
times they refer to the strength of an inference from the com-
plaint as a whole to the conclusion that it shows entitlement to
relief.212
The distinction is important because if plausibility con-
cerns the elements of a claim, and every element of a claim
must be alleged,213 then potentially it is an exceedingly de-
manding standard bearing a strong resemblance to fact-
206. See, e.g., Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082-83 (7th Cir.
2008).
207. See Bone, supra note 163, at 884 (arguing that plausibility is not a
"demanding" standard); cf. Ides, supra note 96, at 611-12 (explaining how
substantive sufficiency can be a minimal standard).
208. See, e.g., PrivacyWear, Inc. v. QTS & CTFC, LLC, No. EDCV 07-1532,
2009 WL 2590082, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2009) ("[The allegations must be
plausible on the face of the complaint." (emphasis added)).
209. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009); Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1964-66.
210. See Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Practice as Ami-
ci Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015).
211. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (discriminatory intent); Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1965 (agreement); see also Bone, supra note 163, at 881.
212. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (entitlement to relief); Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at
1974 (claim); Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 337 (7th Cir. 2009) (claim).
213. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (holding




pleading. But Iqbal disclaimed any such requirement. 214 Thus,
the better interpretation is that plausibility concerns the claim
as a whole. Of course, if the success of the claim depends on a
single disputed element, then the two inquiries are coextensive,
as was the case in Twombly and Iqbal.215 The plausibility stan-
dard is thus an inferential standard and not, or at least not ex-
actly, a factual sufficiency standard, for much besides a com-
plaint's factual allegations bears on the plausibility of the
inferences that can be drawn from it.
B. BETWEEN POSSIBLE AND PROBABLE: DEFINING THE
PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
In both Twombly and Iqbal there is a sharp divergence be-
tween how the Court formulates the plausibility standard in
the abstract and how it is applied to the facts at hand. The for-
mer makes the standard look minimal; the latter makes it look
substantial. Correctly understood, plausibility is a minimal
standard requiring only that the complaint give a court reason
to believe that a claim has merit.
1. Describing the Plausibility Standard Versus Applying the
Plausibility Standard
As formulated by Twombly, the plausibility standard
seems to set a low threshold that plaintiffs must cross. 216 The
Court said that the allegations, on the assumption that they
are true, "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level."2 1 7 Unlawful conduct, explained the Court,
must be more than merely conceivable or possible-the allega-
tions must "suggest" it-but it need not be probable.218 Iqbal
214. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
215. See id. at 1948-49 (2009) (stating that Iqbal's claim depended entirely
upon Ashcroft's and Mueller's purpose); Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (explaining that the viability of the plaintiffs' claim turned en-
tirely on the existence of an agreement).
216. See, e.g., Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499
F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007); McMahon, supra note 2, at 857 ("[T]he Court
eschewed any notion that it was imposing a heightened pleading requirement
... on plaintiffs whose claims were governed by Rule 8.").
217. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (majority opinion).
218. See id. at 1965-66 (explaining that there is a "line between possibility
and plausibility," but cautioning that "[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer
an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage"). The Court acknowledged that the plausibility standard could be met
even though the prospect of recovery was "remote and unlikely." Id. at 1965
(quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
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endorsed these definitionS219 and offered its own: a claim is
plausible when the complaint contains "factual content that al-
lows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defen-
dant is liable for the misconduct alleged."2 20
But both opinions contain language suggesting that the
threshold is considerably higher. For example, allegations that
are "merely consistent with" unlawful conduct are insuffi-
cient. 221 On a motion to dismiss, however, a court is required to
view the complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in his or her favor.222
Why, then, are equivocal allegations insufficient? Has the
Court via the plausibility standard implicitly imposed a more
demanding definition of "reasonable" on the inferences that can
be drawn from a complaint?223
The sense that more is required than the Court's abstract
formulations suggest gains force when one considers its actual
application of the plausibility standard. In Twombly, the Court
held that because the plaintiffs failed to plead facts tending to
exclude the possibility of independent action, they had failed to
state a plausible claim. 2 2 4 Likewise, in Iqbal the Court made
clear that if there are "more likely explanations" or "obvious al-
ternative explanation[s]" for the challenged conduct, an infe-
rence of discriminatory purpose is not plausible. 225 In both cas-
es, it might appear, the plaintiffs' failure to allege facts
rendering their inference the most plausible doomed their
claims.
The contrast between these two formulations is stark. Un-
der the first, "plausibility" means reasonable or more than
merely "possible." Under the second, "plausible" means more
likely than any other (plausible) explanation. After Iqbal,
courts have adopted both interpretations. 2 2 6 Even when the
219. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
220. Id. at 1949.
221. Id. at 1949; Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
222. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1357.
223. Cf. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)
('The Supreme Court did not address the point about drawing reasonable infe-
rences in favor of the plaintiff, but we do not read its decision to undermine
that principle.").
224. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1971-73.
225. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52.
226. Compare, e.g., Shoregood Water Co., v. U.S. Bottling Co., No. RDB 08-
2470, 2009 WL 2461689, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 10, 2009) ("On a spectrum, the
Supreme Court has recently explained that the plausibility standard requires
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lower threshold is used to describe the standard, its stringency
can vary greatly.227 The question, then, is which standard con-
trols?
2. The Higher Plausibility Standard Must Be Rejected in
Favor of the Lower Plausibility Standara
Interpreting "plausible" to mean more likely than opposing
lawful explanations leads to absurd results. In Tellabs v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court interpreted the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act's (PSLRA) "strong infe-
rence" requirement, 228 to mean that an inference of scienter
must be more than merely "reasonable," "plausible," or "per-
missible."229 Rather, it must be "cogent and at least as compel-
ling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts al-
leged."2 3 0 In reaching this result, the Supreme Court expressly
rejected requiring the inference of scienter to be the "'most
plausible of competing inferences."' 23 1 To read Twombly and Iq-
that the pleader show more than a sheer possibility of success, although it
does not impose a probability requirement." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)), with Straeten v. Roper, No. 4:09CV1132 TCM, 2009 WL 2757091, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 26, 2009) ("When faced with alternative explanations for the
alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in determining
whether plaintiff's proffered conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is
more likely that no misconduct occurred." (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-
52)).
227. Compare Hairston v. Geren, No. C-08-382, 2009 WL 2207181, at *4
(S.D. Tex. July 21, 2009) (refusing to dismiss), with Palmore v. Mass, No. 09-
cv-282-bbc, 2009 WL 1749797, at *2 (W.D. Wis. June 19, 2009) (granting mo-
tion to dismiss).
228. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2) (2006) ("In any private action arising under this chapter in which the
plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind." (emphasis added)).
229. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504-05,
2510 (2007).
230. Id. at 2510. That is, so long as the allegations render "an inference of
scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference," the strong infe-
rence standard is met. Id. at 2513.
231. Id. at 2510 (quoting Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004));
see also Brief for American Ass'n for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 10-11, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4805229
at *10-11 ("The majority opinion expressly rejected Justice Scalia's proposed
alternative formulation, 'whether the inference of scienter (if any) is more
plausible than the inference of innocence."' (quoting Tellabs Inc., 127 S. Ct. at
2513 (Scalia, J., concurring))).
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bal as requiring that plaintiffs plead facts sufficient to exclude
"more likely explanations" would make Rule 8's general plead-
ing requirements even more stringent than the PSLRA's heigh-
tened fact pleading requirements. 232 As one commentator has
observed, "[o]f course, that would be ridiculous."233
The better interpretation treats "plausible" as meaning
"reasonable" or "permissible." Iqbal expressly endorsed this in-
terpretation and it is of a piece with the general descriptions of
the plausibility standard put forth in that case and in Twom-
bly. 2 34 Moreover, it comports with the definition of "plausibility"
suggested by the Court in Tellabs, which was decided only a
month after Twombly. 2 35 Indeed, defining "plausible" as "rea-
sonable" places the requirements of Rule 8 in proper relation to
the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA.236 It also
preserves the relevance and vitality of past Supreme Court
pleading decisions, which neither Twombly nor Iqbal purported
to overrule, because for nearly as long as there have been
12(b)(6) motions, there have been courts required to draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.237 Thus,
the plausibility standard requires only that the inference from
the well-pleaded factual allegations to the purported unlawful
conduct be reasonable. If it is, a court must draw it and the
complaint should not be dismissed.
Of course a reasonable inference is not any possible infe-
rence, but that has never been the case.2 38 Rather, whether an
inference is reasonable and a claim plausible will depend on a
variety of factors, including those identified by courts and
commentators and discussed in Part II. These include:
232. Burbank, supra note 140, at 552 ("The language in question can be
read to require that inferences-or to the extent that a complaint does not rely
on inferences, direct allegations-grounding liability not just be plausible in
the Tellabs sense (reasonable), and not just as strong (cogent or compelling) as
any competing account, but stronger than any account of nonliability.").
233. Id.; see also McMahon, supra note 2, at 864.
234. See Iqbal, 127 S. Ct. at 1949; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1965 (2007).
235. See McMahon, supra note 2, at 864-65 ("[T]here is no reason to think
that 'plausible' means anything different in Twombly than it does in Tellabs.").
236. See Bone, supra note 163, at 881 & n.42.
237. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1357; cf. Steinman, supra
note 13, at 34 (noting that a number of Supreme Court decisions are irrecon-
cilable with an evidentiary approach to pleadings).
238. 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1357 (explaining that many
courts have refused to draw "unwarranted inferences" from pleadings).
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(1) reasonable expectations about how the world works,239 (2)
the breadth of perfectly legal behavior described by the com-
plaint's allegations, 240 (3) the amount and type of factual alle-
gations in the complaint,241 (4) the plausibility of other compet-
ing inferences, 242 and (5) the substantive legal context in which
the claim is brought.243 Additionally, though, it depends on the
claim's relation to others of the same sort.2 4 4 As the claim be-
comes more novel, as it moves beyond the boundaries of rea-
sonable judicial expectations, a plaintiff may have to say more,
either factually or legally, to justify the inference of miscon-
duct.24 5 Likewise, when the opposite is true, a largely conclu-
sory allegation may very well be plausible.246 This should be
the case for most claims, even after Iqbal.
C. RECONCILING PLAUSIBILITY AS REASONABILITY WITH IQBAL
AND TWOMBLY
In equating plausibility with reasonability, this Note nec-
essarily rejects the idea that it is a demanding standard. The
question, then, is whether this interpretation can be squared
with the results in Iqbal and Twombly. Careful analysis shows
that it can.
Twombly illustrates the role that peculiarities of substan-
tive law can play in determining whether a claim is plausi-
ble. 2 4 7 Although parallel business conduct, the basis of the
plaintiffs' claim in that case, is evidence from which section 1
239. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading after Tellabs, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 507,
510.
240. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008).
241. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
242. See id. at 1951-52; Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513
F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 2008); Burbank, supra note 140, at 553 ("[J]udgments
about plausibility . .. are necessarily comparative.").
243. See Burbank, supra note 140, at 552.
244. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041-42 (7th
Cir. 1999).
245. See id. at 1042 ("[A] claim that does not fit into an existing legal cate-
gory requires more argument by the plaintiff to stave off dismissal, not less, if
the defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff's claim has no
basis in law."); Ides, supra note 96, at 613 ("One might say that such a claim
also needs more facts.").
246. See Seiner, supra note 161, at 1049-53; cf. FED. R. Civ. P. Forms 11 &
15 (indicating that conclusory allegations suffice to state viable claims in at
least some cases).
247. See Burbank, supra note 140, at 552.
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conspiracy can be inferred, 248 without more it is ambiguous-as
consistent with conspiracy as it is with independent action.249
To prevent false positives, antitrust law thus limits, as a mat-
ter of policy, the inferences that can be drawn from such evi-
dence. 250 For an inference of conspiracy to be permissible, the
plaintiff must couple allegations of parallel conduct with "evi-
dence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent ac-
tion."2 51 By failing to allege such facts, the plaintiffs in Twom-
bly were asking the Court to draw an inference that was
impermissible as a matter of law. Thus, a unique feature of an-
titrust law prevented the plaintiffs' equivocal allegations from
supporting a plausible inference of conspiracy.
. Although Iqbal's analysis adopts much of Twombly's lan-
guage, in truth it was decided on much different grounds. Ra-
ther than exemplifying a similar type of substantive law-
specific limitation on inferences from circumstantial evidence
in the context of Bivens actions and qualified immunity,252 Iq-
bal shows how plausibility determinations are necessarily com-
parative. 253 Once Iqbal's direct allegations concerning Ash-
croft's and Mueller's involvement in the discriminatory policy
were discredited, his complaint was left with only sparse alle-
gations indicating unconstitutional discrimination.254 When the
Court concluded that Iqbal's inference was implausible, it was
not just that other explanations were more likely; it was that,
given the paucity of the surviving allegations, the lawful expla-
nations were so likely that Iqbal's inference could not even be
248. See Theatre Enters. Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540-41 (1954).
249. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1958-59 (2007).
250. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280
(1968); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 628 (2d ed. 1999)
(explaining that the plausibility standard synthesized by Matsushita is "not
limited to summary judgment at all," but instead is a principle of substantive
law).
251. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764, 768 (1984);
see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88.
252. But see Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 08-2820, 2009 WL 1604696,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2009) ("Recently, the Supreme Court extended
[Twombly's] reasoning to a case involving a somewhat analogous safe harbor
from liability: qualified immunity.").
253. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009); cf. Burbank,
supra note 140, at 553.
254. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52.
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deemed reasonable.255 In such situations, a plaintiff must al-
lege more facts to state a plausible claim. 25 6 Because Iqbal's
complaint lacked such facts, dismissal was appropriate. 257 Now,
one might object to the Court's plausibility determination, and
this reading is not necessarily the most natural of the literal
language in Iqbal,2 58 but it must be correct if one is to accept
the Court's descriptions of the plausibility standard and pre-
serve the distinction between heightened pleading and pleading
under Rule 8.
It is unfortunate that the Court's language obscured the
fact that Iqbal and Twombly illustrate very different factors af-
fecting the plausibility determination. But if the above analysis
is correct, it should go some way toward explaining why the
claims in both cases were implausible and why plausibility is
not a demanding standard.
CONCLUSION
Twombly's abrogation of Conley's "no set of facts" language
and introduction of the plausibility standard injected an unwel-
come degree of uncertainty into federal pleading practice. Iqbal
confirmed the general applicability of the plausibility standard,
but failed to clarify the meaning "plausibility." Instead, it en-
dorsed a series of conflicting signals in Twombly that can be
read to suggest that pleading standards have been raised sig-
nificantly. The result is both an abiding confusion at the heart
of the procedural system created by the Federal Rules and
greater license for courts to dismiss potentially meritorious
claims. Rather than embrace the more extreme aspects of Iqbal
and Twombly, courts should recognize that the plausibility
standard is a minimal standard, requiring only sufficient
grounds to draw the reasonable inference that a plaintiff's
claim can proceed to discovery.
255. Cf. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711
("Events that have a very low antecedent probability of occurring nevertheless
do sometimes occur (the Indian Ocean tsunami, for example); and if in a par-
ticular case all the alternatives are ruled out, we can be confident that the
case presents one of those instances in which the rare event did occur." (quot-
ing Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 2005))).
256. See United States v. Beard, 354 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Confi-
dence in a proposition ... is created by excluding alternatives and undermined
by presenting plausible alternatives.").
257. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52.
258. See id. (implying that Iqbal would have to refute "more likely explana-
tions" and "obvious alternative[s]" to state a plausible claim).
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